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Brakes, Not Speed: David Dredge on a Year of Broken Promises
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Brakes, Not Speed: David Dredge on a Year of Broken Promises

Hypernormal Investing Podcast

In May last year, David Dredge and I sat down just weeks after Liberation Day, both of us cautiously hopeful that Scott Bessent would be the adult in the room, a genuine upgrade on Janet Yellen, the Trump whisperer who’d talked the market back from the edge of a cliff.

This time around, I wanted to know whether that hope survived contact with reality. It mostly hasn’t, and the conversation that followed covered a lot of ground. A Fed chair caught between talking tough and doing nothing; a Treasury Secretary quietly doing the Fed’s job for him; Japan’s bond market groaning under a peg nobody can defend; a reawakened gold-and-Bitcoin trade; and the spectacular rise and fall of a 24-year-old who turned $200 million into $45 billion.

The 3-3-3 Plan Didn’t Survive Contact With Reality.

Bessent arrived with a “3-3-3” plan to cut the deficit to 3% of GDP, grow the economy, and lift oil production to 3 million additional barrels a day, built to reverse what Dredge calls the core problem of the era: ever-larger deficits feeding sustained inflation, feeding higher rates, feeding still-larger deficits.

“We’ve sort of missed on all of those,” Dredge told me. DOGE failed, growth hasn’t materially accelerated, and the deficit is, if anything, bigger than when he started.

Instead, over the past few weeks, Bessent has intervened, selling euros to buy yen alongside the Bank of Japan, and expanded Treasury bond buybacks in a program some of his own former allies once criticised Yellen for even contemplating. The sums involved are almost comically small: two to four billion dollars, against a multi-trillion-dollar market. “So de minimis it’s meaningless”. But the point was never the size. The point is who the signal targets.

Dredge calls that audience “Rational Accounting Man” — the employees of banks, insurers and pension funds who manage other people’s money under rules and bonus cycles that have nothing to do with a 30-year investment horizon. You don’t need Rational Accounting Man to believe in the trade. You need to convince him the Treasury has his back long enough to mark a bond at a profit and collect a bonus before anyone checks the math again.

For your capital markets training needs, visit my friends at Finance Talking.

Forward Guidance Is Dead. So, It Turns Out, Is Follow-Through.

Dredge was an early and vocal supporter of Kevin Warsh’s first move as Fed Chair: scrapping forward guidance. Dredge argues it’s not the central bank’s job to tell markets what to do; it’s the central bank’s job to listen to what markets are already telling it. He wrote a note at the time called “Forward Guidance RIP” and meant it as a compliment.

By Warsh’s second meeting, that goodwill had curdled into something more familiar: talk tough, do nothing. With 63 consecutive months of US inflation above target, it’s a target the Fed has made essentially no effort to actually hit. Dredge has been drawing the same chart for years: a roughly 2% inflation trend through 2020, and a 4.5% trend ever since, with the pivot point landing precisely at the introduction of flexible average inflation targeting in the US, and the equivalent symmetric-target announcements at the ECB, Bank of England and others. The asymmetry is naked: twenty basis points under target and policy goes to zero with unlimited QE; a hundred and fifty basis points over, and they’re already cutting.

Warsh had a real opportunity to change that story in his first meeting — three FOMC members dissented in favour of a hike, meaning he needed only to bring the board along with him to make a statement. He didn’t. Whether that was the wrong call or simply the hard one, Dredge thinks it was a missed chance to establish, on day one, who’s actually in charge of the room.

The one reason for cautious optimism: the Fed’s new task forces, and specifically Bill White’s appointment to the inflation framework group. White has been openly rethinking inflation targeting in public, arguing that the Greenspan-era mistake wasn’t failing to hit 2% from below; it was refusing to accept the disinflationary gift of globalisation and a peak working-age population, and inflating asset prices instead to compensate. Mervyn King, on the Fed’s communications task force alongside former Brazilian central bank governor Arminio Fraga, brings a similar complex-adaptive-systems instinct: stop pretending you can predict outcomes, and stop pretending you can control them. Whether Warsh actually listens to either man, rather than the rest of the committee, is an open question.

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Japan, Again

If this all sounds familiar, Dredge thinks it should. He hears strong echoes of 1995 through 1999, the period after Alan Greenspan ran policy too loose on Japan’s behalf, then hiked aggressively, triggering first the Tequila Crisis, then the Asian Financial Crisis, then Russia and LTCM, with every intervening cut building the next bubble. We’re now, by his count, heading into a fourth consecutive year of 20%-plus equity gains, compared to five such years in the late ‘90s. Nobody tightened enough back then either.

The mechanics underneath Japan are genuinely strained. The Bank of Japan’s deputy governor estimated roughly 180 basis points of currently reported Japanese CPI is being suppressed by temporary fuel and childcare subsidies, meaning headline inflation of 2% is closer to 3.8% once you strip the government’s thumb off the scale.

Meanwhile, the 30-year JGB yield sits near 4% against a policy rate of just 1%, a gap that would normally force a central bank’s hand. Dredge thinks the BOJ eventually has to invert that curve, as every other major central bank did in 2022-23. The problem is that an aggressive, Volcker-style response is arguably off the table everywhere now, because every major government is north of 100% debt-to-GDP; hike hard enough, and you blow up the fiscal position you’re trying to protect. Financial repression, the alternative, worked for the US and UK in the 1950s and ‘60s because the baby boomers were entering their peak earning and saving years. It doesn’t work the same way when that same cohort is retiring, and the tax base is shrinking.

Dredge doesn’t think the timing of the MOF’s yen intervention and Bessent’s own market actions in the same week was a coincidence. Central banks and treasury departments talk to each other constantly, he points out, recalling his own trading days in the 1990s when the refrain from Tokyo to Washington was some version of “please don’t tighten, we’re getting killed over here.” A Plaza Accord-style coordination between Tokyo and Washington, in his view, is already quietly underway.

Gold, Bitcoin, and the Tell Hidden in the Options Market

Dredge and his team watch volatility pricing across these interventions as closely as the headlines, and the pattern was telling. The yen intervention caused a 3.5% one-day move, but volatility actually fell, meaning the market wasn’t caught offside. The same story played out in Treasuries after Bessent’s buyback announcement: no spike in rate volatility. The one place volatility did jump was gold and Bitcoin, where correlation, normally quite low between two assets that notionally solve the same problem, spiked to unity.

In Dredge’s reading, that’s the real signal buried in a noisy few weeks: the interventions aimed at defending the dollar system inadvertently reawakened the debasement trade they were meant to suppress. Asian reserve managers sitting on wildly oversized government bond holdings have been diversifying into gold for years; Bessent’s more aggressive moves, including what Dredge calls a “damp squib” of an economic ultimatum toward Iran, have, if anything, accelerated that rotation.

Stablecoins Aren’t About Retail Crypto. They’re About the Eurodollar Market.

The real purpose of stablecoin legislation like the Genius Act wasn’t to get Americans to transact in crypto. It’s about pulling the enormous offshore Eurodollar system- dollars that circulate and get lent around the world outside direct US Treasury financing- into holdings that are forced to sit in US Treasuries instead. A saver in Istanbul or Buenos Aires who’d otherwise park dollars with a local or regional bank gets nudged into a stablecoin whose reserves must be Treasuries. Multiply that globally, and you have the slow death of the Eurodollar market as we’ve known it since the 1980s, and a captive new buyer base for the very bonds Bessent needs sold.

The $45 Billion Lesson

We also talked about the trader some have nicknamed “Mr Awareness” — 24 years old, handed $200 million, briefly up to $45 billion, and then back down to earth. Dredge’s read is less about youth or recklessness and more about where leverage actually lives now. It isn’t sitting on investment bank balance sheets the way it did in the LTCM era; it’s been pushed out to the modern prop-trading houses, Citadel, Jane Street, Susquehanna, Optiver, who absorb these blown-up books from prime brokers and mark them back up the next day, the way Bankers Trust and others absorbed LTCM’s positions. The more interesting error wasn’t the leverage on his long AI bets; it was that his short book, betting against the AI sceptics, had genuinely unlimited downside, while his long book had a known floor. That’s not a hedge. That’s two directional bets dressed up as one.

Where the Convexity Is Now

Over the past year, the “dispersion trade” did most of the work: index volatility (the VIX) stayed pinned near historic lows while single-name volatility blew out, as structured-product flow shifted en masse from index to single-stock structures starting in 2023. That dynamic has largely played out already. FX volatility has been compressed for a long stretch, punctuated by brief, sharp repricings around Liberation Day and the yen intervention, but corporate hedging flow keeps selling it back down.

The newer, more interesting crack is showing up in credit: CDS spreads on AI-related borrowing —names like Broadcom and Oracle —where guarantee-overlay structures echo the monoline insurance deals of the pre-2008 era, have started to widen in ways the rest of public credit hasn’t.

His conclusion is the same one: don’t try to forecast which of these cracks widens first. Participate in the ongoing asset-price inflation, because that’s the world we’re actually in, but hold explicit, convex, negatively-correlated protection against the side you can’t predict. “Put good brakes on your car,” as he puts it, “so you can drive faster.” Bonds have failed at that job, up in the good years, down in the bad ones.

Something else has to do the braking instead.

Thanks for listening.


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Note to readers: I will be away travelling for much of October. With differing time zones and unknown internet availability, my posts will be sporadic at best for the time I’m away. I will suspend paid suscriptions for the month. All paid subscribers will get an additional month added to their term. Normal coverage will resume in November and in the meantime I hope to post updates as I travel. Thanks again for your continued support, I really appreciate it.

Jeremy

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